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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the incidence of rent subsidies. We use administrative 
panel data on subsidy recipients in the UK and exploit a natural experiment in which 
entitlements were cut for about a million households. In the short-run, about 90% of the 
incidence of the cuts is found to be on tenants. We also uncover an important dimension of 
heterogeneity in the balance of incidence between tenants and their landlords. We find that 
the share of the incidence of the cut that falls on landlords, rather than tenants, is higher in 
cases where the previous system looked more generous relative to tenants‟ likely housing 
needs. This is informative about the likely incidence of alternative rent subsidy schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
Targeted demand-side subsidies for rented housing are a major and growing element of 
modern welfare states. In this paper we provide new evidence on their incidence, exploiting a 
natural experiment provided by a substantial package of cuts to a means-tested cash transfer 
for renters in the UK, known as Housing Benefit (HB). In the short run, we find that a large 
majority of the incidence of the cuts fell on tenants, but we also uncover significant 
heterogeneity in the balance of incidence between tenants and their landlords. This yields 
new insights into the relationship between the design of rent subsidies and the extent to which 
the programmes actually help their intended beneficiaries.  
The design and incidence of these subsidies is of great importance. In the US, on which 
much of the empirical literature on the incidence of rent subsidies is based, the federal 
government spent about $18 billion (0.1% of GDP) in 2014 subsidising the rents of 2.2 
million families through Housing Choice Vouchers, the largest such federal program. 
Demand-side subsidies are more substantial elsewhere. In Great Britain, the government 
spends around £9 billion per year, or 0.5% of GDP, subsidising the rents of 1.6 million 
families in privately rented accommodation through HB, which any renter with income and 
financial assets low enough can receive.
2
 If rent subsidies raise the price of rented 
accommodation, governments are transferring some of these resources to landlords rather 
than low-income tenants.  
We estimate the incidence of a package of cuts to HB in the UK which was phased in 
during 2011 and 2012. The date at which existing recipients were affected depended, for the 
most part, on the calendar month in which their claim began. This means we can implement a 
difference-in-differences design to estimate the effect of the subsidy reduction on rents, using 
those not yet rolled onto the reformed system as a control group at each point in time, and can 
track the impact of the subsidy cut up to 11 months out. Importantly, the cuts were larger for 
certain groups which were thought to have previously had overly-generous entitlements. For 
new claims, the reformed system applied to all claims beginning after a particular date, so we 
 
2
 The US government also provides housing assistance to low-income families through programmes such as Project-based Rental 
Assistance (which cost $12 billion in 2014). In addition to HB in the private rented sector, the UK government subsidises tenants in public 
housing through a combination of sub-market rents and HB. US figures from Congressional Budget Office 
(https://www.cbo.gov/publication/50782); GB figures from Department for Work and Pensions 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/benefit-expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2015). The evolution of the US system is described in 
Susin (2002). Hills (2007) provides a detailed account of the UK case. 
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use an interrupted time series approach. This analysis of new claimants addresses concerns 
that our estimates for existing recipients might have been confounded by a contemporaneous 
impact of the treatment (i.e. the reforms) on our control group: our analysis of new claimants 
relies on no such control group. Furthermore, new HB claimants are much more likely to be 
taking on new tenancies than existing HB recipients, so there is much less scope for 
adjustment costs to be limiting their response to the cuts. These are important, given that we 
find that rents for existing recipients responded little on average.  
We estimate that the quality-adjusted rents of subsidy recipients were little changed, on 
average, by the reforms, meaning that, in the short-run, about 90% of the incidence of cuts to 
subsidies was on the tenants rather than their landlords. But we uncover significant 
heterogeneity in the balance of incidence between tenants and their landlords, with tenants for 
whom the original subsidy level was, arguably, high relative to their needs seeing significant 
falls in their quality-adjusted rents, meaning less than two-thirds of the cut was incident on 
them. A likely explanation for the significant heterogeneity in incidence is differences in the 
elasticity of demand for rented housing. The pre-reform HB system meant that certain groups 
were subsidised to consume an amount of housing that was high relative to their needs. As a 
result, their demand was relatively responsive when the subsidy was cut back: although basic 
housing is a necessity, it is more likely to be a luxury good at the margin if housing 
consumption is already high (relative to needs). As a result, more of the incidence of the 
subsidy cut on these subsidy recipients was shifted to their landlords. This has important 
policy implications. If, as cuts to subsidies bite further down the distributions of rent and 
housing quality, the average demand elasticity of affected tenants falls, then the incidence of 
any further reductions in generosity would tend to fall even more on subsidised tenants rather 
than their landlords.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how this paper relates to the 
existing literature looking at the incidence of housing subsidies. Section 3 outlines the details 
of the reforms to HB that are key for our empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data and 
explains our sample selection. Section 5 describes our empirical strategy and discusses 
identification. Section 6 presents our estimates of the incidence of rent subsidies including, 
importantly, heterogeneity in that incidence. Section 7 discusses our results and concludes.  
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2. Related literature 
We build on evidence about the incidence of rent subsidies provided by a number of 
previous studies. These have used a variety of empirical strategies, data and institutional 
settings. As we will explain, the heterogeneity in incidence we uncover in our own analysis 
may help reconcile some of the variation in the findings of previous work.  
For the United States, Susin (2002) effectively compared long run rent trends between 
areas where housing voucher supply has been expanded by different amounts, estimating that 
the existence of the voucher system had increased the rents of non-recipients by 16% – 
although Olsen (2003) argues that one might be concerned about a failure of common rent 
trends between areas that saw different increases in housing voucher supply. In this paper we 
focus on the rents of subsidy recipients, not non-recipients. But we are careful to assess (and 
rule out) the possibility that contemporaneous effects of rent subsidies on the rents of non-
recipients, of the kind implied by Susin‟s results, might be confounding our own estimates – 
or more precisely, given our empirical setting, that changes in rent subsidies might affect the 
rents of recipients yet to be directly impacted by those changes. 
 More recent evidence from the US suggests that housing vouchers lead recipients to rent 
higher-quality properties, but have little impact on the average price of rental housing. 
Eriksen and Ross (2015) exploit an area-varying expansion in the US housing voucher 
program, and find that average rents are unaffected by the voucher expansion, but that this 
masks important heterogeneity: when the supply of housing vouchers is increased, the price 
of low-quality housing falls, and the price of housing just below the subsidy ceiling increases, 
consistent with voucher recipients moving to more expensive units (a conclusion supported 
by Collinson and Ganong (2018)). The result that housing vouchers do not affect average 
rental prices towards the bottom of the rental market (and hence that the incidence falls on 
tenants) is consistent with our conclusion that, on average, the incidence of the cuts we 
analyse fell mostly on tenants. But a key contribution of this paper is to uncover another 
important dimension of heterogeneity: we show that the effect of targeted subsidies on rents 
varies according to the level of the rent ceiling. Among groups whose subsidy cap was cut 
from a level that looked high relative to their needs, the incidence of cuts fell on their 
landlords to a greater extent. 
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A small body of evidence from outside the US has found that a substantial share of the 
incidence of more generous rent subsidies falls on landlords. Laferrère and Le Blanc (2004), 
Fack (2006) and Grislain-Letremy and Trevien (2014), using different reforms and slightly 
different identification strategies, all find that the incidence of higher rent subsidies in France 
is mostly on landlords. Viren (2013) estimated that one-third to one-half of the incidence of a 
Finnish rent subsidy is on landlords. Sayag and Zussman (2015) found that a voucher scheme 
for students in central Jerusalem increased the rents of both recipients and non-recipients, 
such that landlords captured four-fifths of the value of the grants. The heterogeneity we 
uncover can provide a way of reconciling these results with those from the US and our own 
study. In some cases, the reforms these papers exploit are extensions of housing subsidies to 
specific groups that might be expected to have highly elastic housing demand (e.g. students). 
When we restrict attention to groups who plausibly share that characteristic (e.g. single adults 
aged under 35), we get more similar results. 
The heterogeneity that we find is also important in understanding how our results relate to 
the only previous paper on this topic that uses UK data: Gibbons and Manning (2006), which 
looks at a cut to HB in the mid-1990s that applied only to new claimants, and affected those 
with the highest rents among households of their size in their local area. By effectively 
comparing the rent levels of new claimants and existing recipients, they estimated that 60% 
to two-thirds of the incidence of the cut was on landlords. This is consistent with our finding 
that the incidence on landlords was much higher where tenants were previously subsidised to 
rent properties further towards the top of the quality distribution for their type of household.  
3. A natural experiment: reforms to UK Housing Benefit 
Our estimates of the incidence of rent subsidies exploit a set of reforms to Housing Benefit 
(HB) in the UK in 2011 and 2012. Here we outline the features of the reform that are most 
important for our identification strategy; further details are available in Appendix A. 
HB is an entitlement-based, means-tested, cash transfer for renters: any renter with income 
and financial assets low enough will receive it if they apply. We focus on tenants of private 
landlords; those in public housing were unaffected by the cuts that we exploit. In the majority 
of cases (80% in January 2011), HB is paid to the tenant (who remains responsible for paying 
rent to their landlord), rather than being paid direct to the landlord. There is no systematic 
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direct contact between the landlords of subsidised tenants and any government agency. For 
recipients whose HB claim began before April 2011, maximum entitlement to HB (before the 
means-test is applied) was a function of actual rent and a cap known as the Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) rate, given by                                  . The 
applicable LHA rate varies geographically (according to Broad Rental Market Areas, 
BRMAs
3
) and by the subsidy recipient‟s family type (as detailed in Appendix A). If subsidy 
recipients rented a property whose rent was below their applicable LHA rate, then they could 
keep the first £15 per week of the difference.  
3.1 How reforms affected existing recipients 
In our main empirical analysis we look at those who were already receiving HB before April 
2011. These existing recipients saw their entitlements reduced in two ways. First, on the first 
annual anniversary of their claim after April 2011 (i.e. at some point between April 2011 and 
March 2012) the weekly „excess‟ of up to £15 that subsidy recipients could keep if their rent 
was below the LHA rate was removed.
 
Second, nine months later (i.e. at some point between 
January and December 2012) existing recipients saw their entitlements reduced by a number 
of changes to the applicable LHA rate. The overall impact of these cuts to LHA rates was to 
reduce the cap on HB payments, giving subsidy recipients an incentive to seek cheaper 
properties or to pay less for a given property. The biggest single change to LHA rates was to 
base them on the 30
th
 percentile of local rent levels among the applicable property type, 
rather than the median, as previously. But there were additional cuts to LHA rates that were 
much more tightly targeted on three particular groups: 
1. Those previously deemed to need a 5-bedroom property saw their LHA rate reduced 
from one based on the rental prices of local 5-bedroom properties to one based on the 
rental prices of local 4-bedroom properties. Affected families all had at least 4 children 
under 16 (see Appendix A). 
2. Those in some areas of central London saw their LHA rate reduced by the imposition 
of „national caps‟, which bound only in those areas. 
 
3
 There are 192 BRMAs in Great Britain, each containing around 140,000 households (330,000 individuals) on average, making them 
around three times the size of US counties. 
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3. Single adults aged 25-34 saw their LHA rate reduced from one based on the rental 
prices of local one-bedroom properties to one based on the local rental prices of single 
rooms in shared properties. 
Our analysis of heterogeneity in the incidence of the subsidy reduction is based on these three 
groups of individuals. In each case, one can think of the group-specific reduction in LHA 
rates as being motivated by a belief that the existing system was particularly generous to 
these individuals, either in terms of the quality of housing it enabled them to purchase relative 
to their needs (those previously deemed entitled to a 5-bedroom property and single childless 
25-34 year olds) or in terms of the area in which they were enabled to live (those in central 
London). One might therefore expect the elasticity of housing demand at the margin to be 
different (higher) for these particular groups.  
Because of the phased roll-out of the reforms described above, the point in time at which 
individuals were affected depended on the month in which their claim anniversary fell. We 
refer to a group of individuals whose claim anniversary fell in a given month as a „claim-
cohort‟, and hence there are 12 claim-cohorts. Otherwise-identical recipients in different 
claim-cohorts faced different levels of subsidy at the same point in time. This motivates the 
difference-in-differences design that we specify in Section 5.  
3.2 How reforms affected new claimants 
Individuals begin a new claim to HB either because they move property and begin a new 
tenancy (around a third of cases) or because other changes in their circumstances – such as a 
fall in earnings or a change in household composition – render them eligible (the remaining 
two thirds of cases). New claims of HB were also affected by the reforms described above, 
but the way the changes were rolled out was different. Those individuals who began their 
claim to HB from April 2011 onwards were subject to the reductions in the subsidy 
immediately
4: they received no „excess‟ if their rent was below the LHA rate, and their LHA 
rates were determined by the new, less generous rules.  
 
4
 The only exception was the change in the entitlement of single 25-34 year olds without children, which took effect from January 2012. 
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4. Data and sample selection 
We use administrative monthly panel data on HB claims in Great Britain, from the Single 
Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE). Details of the construction of key variables, including data 
cleaning, are given in Appendix B. 
4.1 Existing recipients 
Our estimates are based on a random one-in-three sample of individuals receiving HB, 
renting from a private landlord, and assessed under the LHA rules in January 2011, shortly 
before the reforms were implemented. These recipients were affected by the removal of the 
£15 excess on their first annual claim anniversary from April 2011, and were typically 
affected by the other elements of the reform package nine months after that. We use monthly 
observations for these subsidy recipients between January 2010 and November 2013 
inclusive, meaning that we follow all recipients for 11 months after the cuts to LHA rates, or 
20 months after their first annual claim anniversary following April 2011 (when they lost the 
„excess‟ of up to £15 per week that was previously payable if their rent was below their LHA 
rate, as described above). 
After dropping 15% of the sample with missing information, we have an estimation 
sample of 239,723 subsidy recipients. Table 1 shows basic demographic characteristics, 
employment status and a measure of local neighborhood deprivation for subsidy recipients, 
before the reform took effect, for the universe of HB recipients and our estimation sample. 
Almost 80% of recipients are single adults (of which slightly less than half have children), 
over half are aged between 25 and 44, in around 70% of cases neither the claimant nor any 
partner works, and around a third of recipients live in the most deprived fifth of 
neighborhoods.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of weekly rents and HB entitlements for the two samples. 
The median rent paid by recipients is £115 a week, and the inter-quartile range is £92 to 
£150; this compares to median weekly household income in the UK population of around 
£500 a week.
5
 Median HB entitlements are £4 a week lower than median rents, meaning that 
at least half of recipients faced a shortfall (i.e. their rent exceeded their HB entitlement) 
before the reforms. 
 
5
 Source: authors‟ calculations using 2010–11 Family Resources Survey. 
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4.2 New claimants 
Our estimates for new claimants are based on all claims that began between 1
st
 June 2010 
and 1
st
 December 2011; we extract information on the claimants‟ circumstances at the time of 
the claim for HB. Figure 1 shows a seven-day moving average of HB entitlements for new 
claims between June 2010 and December 2011, and Figure 2 shows the equivalent for rents. 
A striking feature of both is the large spikes in mean entitlements and rents just before the 
reforms affected new claimants on 1 April 2011, which we discuss further in the Appendix. 
Because of this, we select our sample to exclude a window of data around the reform. We 
take a conservative approach and exclude all new claims made between 1st December 2010 
and 31st May 2011, marked with vertical lines on Figures 1 and 2.
6
 This means that our 
estimation sample contains new claims between June and November 2010 (giving us 336,486 
observations from before the reforms took place) and between June and November 2011 
(giving us 334,093 observations from after the reforms took place). It is then straightforward 
to see the patterns in the data that underlie our formal results for new claimants in Section 6. 
Having been quite flat in the pre-reform period (with, if anything, a gentle linear decline), 
entitlements to HB clearly settle at a lower level after the reforms, whereas there is little 
discernible break in the trend for rents across the pre- and post-reform windows. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
6
 We have conducted sensitivity analysis and, as the figure suggests, our estimates are robust to small shifts in the window of data 
excluded. 
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Average Housing Benefit entitlement of new claimants by date of claim  
(seven-day moving average) 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Average rent of new claimants by date of claim  
(seven-day moving average) 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
5.1 Specification for existing recipients 
For our main estimates of the extent to which entitlements to HB and rents changed as a 
result of the reforms, we exploit the variation in the point in time at which existing recipients 
were affected by the reforms. This variation is between „claim-cohorts‟: the 12 groups whose 
claim anniversary fell in a different calendar month. The nature of the roll-out meant that 
otherwise-identical recipients in different claim-cohorts faced different levels of subsidy at 
the same point in time. In our analysis of the impact on all existing recipients and our 
examination of heterogeneity in the incidence of the reform, we use a difference-in-
differences (DiD) linear regression, specified as: 
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where i indexes subsidy recipients who are observed at multiple points in calendar time t, 
live in area (BRMA) a, and are members of claim-cohort c, defined by the calendar month in 
which their annual claim anniversary falls.
7
 The main outcome variables are rent, HB 
entitlement, and shortfall (the difference between the rent and HB entitlement), all measured 
in £s per week.
8
 
  is a vector of control variables. For our main outcomes, this includes dummies for the 
full set of interactions between BRMA and number of bedrooms in the property (which we 
have top-coded at 5), and quintiles of deprivation measured at the neighborhood level.
9
 This 
rich set of control variables helps to ensure we do not confound changes in property or 
neighborhood characteristics with changes in the price of accommodation. If, despite these 
controls, there remain unobserved falls in quality, then we will pick this up as a price change 
rather than a quality change, and this would lead us to over-estimate the incidence of the 
subsidy on landlords, and under-estimate the incidence on tenants. To anticipate our results, 
though, this would only mean that our conclusion about the incidence of the reforms holds 
even more strongly in reality. We also control for family type and age, in case these change 
over time for reasons unrelated to the reform in ways that are not adequately captured by our 
time trends: these make a negligible difference to our estimates. We also present results from 
regressions that do not include controls for property and neighborhood characteristics. A 
comparison of these results to those from our preferred covariate-adjusted estimates 
summarises the extent to which recipients responded to the subsidy cut by renting housing of 
lower quality or in less desirable areas.  
The reforms we study included specific targeted components designed to reduce support 
for three particular subgroups, whose level of entitlement to support under the previous 
 
7
 As mentioned in Section 3, some individuals are affected by the reforms earlier than the rest of their claim-cohort as a result of having a 
change of circumstance that triggers a reassessment. Hence the difference-in-difference approach we employ could be thought of as an 
„intent to treat‟ design – although rather than some individuals in our „treatment‟ group avoiding treatment, we have some individuals in our 
„control‟ group ending up as treated. 
8 
Our administrative data source records contractual rents, which may differ from actual rents either because tenants are in arrears or 
because landlords informally accept a rent that is lower than the contractual one. We are not able to tell whether the prevalence of these 
phenomena was affected by the reforms, but qualitative evidence suggests that rent arrears did increase after the reforms (Beatty et al, 2014). 
The ultimate implication of this for the incidence of the reforms is not clear, as it depends whether or not these arrears are eventually settled. 
It is also not clear whether household-survey-based measures of rents, as used in some other studies (including Gibbons and Manning 
(2006)), would be more likely to pick up actual rents paid or contractual rent. 
9
 The local deprivation measures were not matched in to the SHBE data at the time of writing of Beatty et al (2013). This means that the 
results presented here for new claimants are not numerically identical to those in Beatty et al (2013), though they are extremely similar and 
no qualitative conclusions are affected. 
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system was deemed to be especially high relative to their housing needs. A key part of our 
analysis focuses on whether we see evidence that the balance of incidence between tenants 
and landlords is different in these cases, as economic theory might suggest. To examine this 
potential heterogeneity in incidence as flexibly as possible, we estimate equation (1) 
separately for those subgroups. As part of our heterogeneity analysis we also consider as 
outcomes property size (as measured by number of bedrooms or whether the property is 
shared), the probability of moving house, and the probability of moving out of central 
London. This allows us to examine whether the elasticity of housing demand appears greater 
among tenants who bear less of the incidence of the cuts, providing supporting evidence for 
the underlying mechanisms driving any heterogeneity in incidence. When looking at these 
outcomes, we remove controls for housing quality and replace them with fixed effects for 
BRMA at the start of the period of observation. When the outcome is whether the claimant 
moved house, we include controls for estimated rental contract and claim anniversaries. 
We estimate equation (1) by OLS where the outcome variable is continuous, and as a 
probit when the outcome is dichotomous. Estimated standard errors allow for 
heteroskedasticity and for errors clustered at the BRMA level.Identification of   in equation 
(1) depends on the standard „common trends‟ assumption: in the absence of the reforms, 
trends in the outcome variables would have been unrelated to treatment status (at the mean, 
conditional on covariates). It also depends on the assumption that the „control‟ group is 
unaffected by the treatment. We discuss these assumptions in turn.  
In our context, common trends means that there should be no systematic, unobserved, 
time-varying differences between subsidy recipients who are in different claim-cohorts. This 
is untestable, but there are at least two good reasons to believe it to be true. First, there is 
strong evidence of common trends across claim-cohorts before the reforms took place: Figure 
3 plots changes over time in mean HB entitlements of three example claim-cohorts (May, 
August and November), after controlling for the composition of properties being rented.
10
 It 
shows that, before May 2011, trends in HB entitlement are extremely similar across the three 
claim-cohorts. Then in May 2011, the May claim-cohort saw their HB entitlements fall, as 
they lost any excess. This cohort then saw a further fall in HB entitlement nine months later, 
 
10
 Specifically, we plot mean residuals from a regression of LHA entitlements on all interactions between BRMA and number of 
bedrooms. 
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in February 2012, as they were affected by the rest of the reform package. The same pattern 
holds for the August and November claim-cohorts, but with the drops in entitlements 
occurring three and six months later. The fact that differences between cohorts appear only as 
the reform takes effect for some cohorts and not others, and then disappear again once all 
cohorts are fully affected, is compelling evidence that in the absence of reforms there would 
have been no differences in outcome variables across claim-cohorts. We provide a further 
assessment of common trends by allowing for treatment effects before the treatment was 
actually applied, and this reveals no economically important differences in trends in HB 
entitlements and rents across cohorts (after controls) prior to the roll-out of the subsidy cuts 
(see Section 6, and in particular the top panel of Table 3). 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
Average maximum entitlement of existing recipients by month 
(Residual from regression of entitlements on BRMA and number of bedrooms, £pw) 
 
Appendix Table A1 described four example claim-cohorts (February, May, August and 
November) and shows that they look almost identical in terms of demographic 
characteristics, employment status, local-area deprivation, rents and housing benefit 
entitlements. Further evidence of the extremely high degree of similarity between different 
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cohorts is provided by the fact that the inclusion of „claim-cohort‟ fixed effects has a minimal 
impact on our estimated coefficients, as shown in column (3) of Table 3. 
The second assumption required for identification – that the treatment does not affect the 
outcomes of the control group – might not hold if the reforms affected the rents of those not 
yet rolled onto the reformed system. In a market with no frictions and perfect competition, 
there would be a single (quality-adjusted) rental price at all times. In such a world, the rents 
paid by all claim-cohorts would change instantaneously, regardless of whether they had been 
directly affected by the cuts in subsidy, and estimation of equation (1) would therefore find 
that the reform had no impact on rents, regardless of the true impact. More generally, market-
level effects of a less extreme nature would attenuate our estimates of the extent to which the 
reforms were incidence on the landlords of existing recipients. However, the rental market is 
not in reality characterised by spot prices: tenants‟ rents are usually fixed for the duration of 
their contract (typically a year). Most crucially, though, our analysis of the impact on the 
rents of new claimants acts as a natural robustness check. The different nature of the roll-out 
for new claimants means we can use identifying assumptions for those claimants that would 
not be violated by market-level effects. We detail this below.  
5.2 Specification for new claimants 
New claimants were affected by the reformed HB system if their claim began in April 
2011 or afterwards, motivating us to use an „Interrupted Time Series‟ design, as follows: 
                                                  
             (2) 
i indexes new subsidy recipients starting a claim at time t who live in area a. The 
coefficient of interest is  . We specify       as a BRMA-specific linear trend that is allowed 
to vary between the pre- and post- reform periods.   is a vector of control variables that 
includes dummies for the full set of interactions between BRMA and number of bedrooms in 
the property (which we have top-coded at 5), and family type and age. Equation (2) is 
estimated using OLS, and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
BRMA level.  
The key identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the „interruption‟, the outcome 
variable would have been a smooth function of time around April 2011, when the reforms 
began applying to new claimants. In practice, our strategy is not a pure interrupted time series 
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design because we exclude a 6-month window of data around the date of the reforms, so our 
treatment effects rely on some extrapolation, being based on any difference in the covariate-
adjusted outcome between our pre- and post- treatment windows that cannot be explained by 
time trends. There are at least two good reasons to be confident about this identification 
strategy. First, the trends in HB entitlements and rents for new claimants both before and 
after the reforms were very simple, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Second, as Appendix Table 
A2 shows, the pre- and post-reform claimants in our estimation sample are extremely similar 
with respect to observed characteristics. Importantly, identification does not depend on a 
comparison group observed contemporaneously (as it does for the analysis of existing 
recipients), and so the estimates are not susceptible to bias if cuts to rent subsidies also 
impact the rents of those not (yet) affected by those cuts. We therefore view this analysis as 
an important robustness check on our main results. 
5.3 Are our results informative of long-run effects? 
In common with the majority of the empirical literature examining this question, we 
estimate effects over a relatively short time horizon. The nature of the identification strategy 
suggests we have accurate estimates of the incidence of the cut to HB on existing recipients 
up to 11 months after it took effect. Two main reasons why the longer-run effects might be 
different would be if there were rental contract rigidity (e.g. because of renegotiation costs) or 
fixed costs for tenants of moving property or for landlords of finding new tenants.
11
 
But there are several good reasons to believe that our short-run estimates are informative 
of the long-run effects of the subsidy reduction, although none is conclusive. First, by the 
time of the final observation we have for each existing recipient, the vast majority have had 
(assuming they are on year-long contracts with their landlord) at least one opportunity to 
move or negotiate a lower rent since the point at which they were affected by the package of 
cuts, and some will have had two opportunities: our final observation is 20 months after the 
£15 excess was removed, and 11 months after being fully rolled on to the reformed system. 
Second, as Figure 4 shows, we find no evidence that the incidence of the reforms changes 
between when they start to be applied and 11 months after they applied in full. On the 
contrary the estimated pass-through parameter remains flat throughout this period. As 
 
11
 See Genesove (2003) for empirical evidence on the importance of price stickiness in the rental market. 
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mentioned above, many recipients would have had an opportunity to renegotiate rent by the 
end of that 11-month window. Third, although we cannot rule out that recipients would 
renegotiate their tenancy agreements after the period covered by our data, for some subgroups 
we do see quick rent responses, including for a set of tenants with several children for whom 
the fixed costs of moving are likely to be relatively high (we discuss the potential reasons for 
this in Section 6). Fourth, the UK rental market more generally is characterised by levels of 
mobility that suggest that the costs of moving are not particularly high for a large number of 
households. Survey data from 2013–14 indicates that over a third of those in private rented 
accommodation had lived there for less than a year, and over half for less than two years.
12
 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
Note: Figure uses estimates from the same models estimated in column 5 of Table 3. The pass-through parameter is calculated as the 
estimated impact on rent divided by the estimated impact on housing benefit. 
 
Estimated pass-through parameter, by months since main impact of HB cuts 
(Impact on rent divided by impact on HB, with 95% confidence interval) 
 
 
12
 Source: 2013–14 English Housing Survey headline report (https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-housing-survey-2013-to-
2014-headline-report). 
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Finally, a key reason for believing that our estimates are informative about the long-run 
effects of the subsidy reduction is that our estimates for new claimants provide a valuable 
robustness check. As mentioned in Section 3, analysis of contemporaneous survey data 
indicates that around a third of new HB claims coincide with a new tenancy
13
, where 
rigidities caused by renegotiation costs or fixed costs of moving are not applicable (unlike for 
the other two thirds, for whom the most likely reason for a new claim is a drop in income that 
makes them eligible, e.g. a movement out of paid work). If these kinds of rigidities were 
causing our estimated effects on rents for existing recipients to be close to zero, then one 
would not expect to obtain the same result for new claimants; but as we are about to show, 
we do obtain the same results for new claimants as for existing recipients.  
6.  Regression results 
6.1 Results for existing recipients 
Table 3 presents estimates based on equation (1) for the effect of the reforms on rents, 
entitlement to HB and the difference between them (the so-called “shortfall”). We add 
regressors to build up to our preferred specification. For each specification we show four sets 
of coefficients. The first set of coefficients captures whether we record any differences in 
rents and HB entitlements 12 months before the point of main impact of the reforms: the 
coefficients      from equation (1). This effectively provides a „placebo test‟ of our 
empirical strategy. The remaining sets of coefficients capture the impact of the reform at 
different stages: the point at which subsidy recipients reach their first annual claim 
anniversary after April 2011, at which time they lost the excess; the point nine months later 
when they were subject to all elements of the reform package; and eleven months after that, 
which is the latest point in our data at which we observe all claim-cohorts. These coefficients 
are        and     from equation (1).  
In column 1 we have no control variables: the only variables on the right hand side are the 
vector of dummies corresponding to the number of months before or after the month in which 
the subsidy recipient was rolled onto the new system. In the absence of controls for 
 
13
 Source: authors‟ calculations using the 2011–12 Family Resources Survey.  
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underlying time trends or changes in our measures of housing quality, rents increase as the 
reform is rolled out, while HB entitlements fall only slightly. This is because there was an 
upwards underlying trend in rents and HB entitlements. In column 2, we add our controls for 
housing quality (local area, number of bedrooms and their interaction, along with a measure 
of neighborhood deprivation). Once these controls are included, the rise in rents over time is 
smaller, and the falls in HB entitlements are larger, reflecting the fact that changes in quality 
were acting to increase rents (and hence entitlements) over this period, independent of the 
reform. Column 3 adds 12 fixed effects for our „claim-cohorts‟: the inclusion of these fixed 
effects makes little difference to our estimates, providing evidence of no systematic 
differences between claim-cohorts. In column 4, we add our time trends (see Section 5). 
There was a secular upwards trend in rental prices and entitlements over time, and so the 
inclusion of time trends leads to a reduction in our estimated effects of the reforms on rents 
(which become negative after the loss of excess) and HB entitlements. Finally, our preferred 
specification (column 5) adds controls for family type and age; this makes little difference to 
the estimates. 
Reassuringly, in our main specification there is almost no estimated impact on HB 
entitlements or rents 12 months before the main impact of the reforms, and this supports the 
suggestion provided by Figure 3 that we do have common trends across claim-cohorts. As a 
result of the removal of excesses, our preferred specification suggests that recipients lost an 
average of about £5 per week, and rents were reduced slightly, by about £0.80 per week, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. We attribute this fall in rents to an 
anticipatory adjustment to the remaining, impending reforms; we would not expect landlords 
to lose out from the excess removal in isolation. Indeed for tenants with one-year tenancies 
whose claim anniversary coincides with the anniversary of their tenancy, this point in time 
would be the last formal opportunity to change rents before the remaining reforms took 
effect. 
The loss of HB rose to £8.31 per week (7% of pre-reform mean entitlements) nine months 
later, when the rest of the reforms took effect. But the impact on rents did not change, 
remaining at below £1 a week (and no longer statistically significant). These point estimates 
imply that around 90% (£7.58 of £8.31 per week) of the incidence of the cuts was on tenants 
at this point, with the remaining 10% on landlords, and the 95% confidence interval for the 
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pass-through parameter – the share of the cut incident on landlords – spans from –7% to 
+25%. The estimated impact on rents remains small over the period covered by our data, 
changing from just £0.73 a week to £0.79 a week eleven months after the main impact, by 
which point the vast majority of recipients will have had at least one opportunity to 
renegotiate rents or move house. We remain unable to reject the hypothesis that the pass-
through parameter is zero. We obtain similar results for a wide range of demographic and 
geographic subgroups (including age, family type and region).
14
 As noted in Section 5, the 
proportion of the incidence that fell on tenants would be even higher than we estimate if 
tenants adjust to the reforms by choosing lower quality properties in ways not captured by 
our controls for local area, number of bedrooms and neighborhood quality. 
6.2 Results for new claimants 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the impact of the reform on the rents and HB entitlements 
of new claimants, based on equation (2). Again, the different columns build up to our 
preferred specification. Focussing on our preferred specification (column 4), we estimate that 
the reforms reduced HB awards for new claimants – conditional on claimants‟ characteristics 
and property type and location – by an estimated average of £8.20 per week. Almost all of the 
incidence of this – an estimated £7.80, or 95% – was on the tenants. Again, we obtain similar 
results for a wide range of demographic subgroups.
15
 These estimates do not rely on the 
assumption that a contemporaneous control group is unaffected by the treatment (see Section 
5), and so the fact that the estimates on incidence are very similar to our main results is 
evidence against the possibility that our main estimates were biased downwards by a 
violation of that assumption. It also provides evidence that our main estimates are not driven 
by short-run rigidities or fixed costs of moving, as these concerns apply to a lesser extent 
when looking at the impact on new claimants: we estimate that around a third of new claims 
to HB coincide with new tenancies, rendering short-run rigidities due to renegotiation costs or 
fixed costs of moving irrelevant. Even if rents are only affected for that one third of new 
claimants who also have a new tenancy (i.e. scaling up the estimates in Table 4 by a factor of 
3), then this would imply that rents fell by £1.38 as a result of the reform for that third, still 
leaving the vast majority (83%) of the incidence on those tenants. 
 
14
 Brewer et. al, 2014, reports full results for a variety of sub-groups. 
15
 Reported in Beatty et. al., 2013. 
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6.3 Heterogeneity in incidence 
Table 5 shows separate estimates of the impact of the HB cuts for three subgroups:  
 single adults without dependent children due to be aged 25-34 at the point that the 
reforms took effect, who would have been entitled to the 1-bedroom LHA rate in the 
absence of reform but instead were entitled only to the shared accommodation rate;  
 large families entitled to the 5-bedroom LHA rate before the reform but the 4-bedroom 
rate after the reform;  
 recipients living in one of the five BRMAs in which the overall nationwide caps on 
LHA rates now bind (those five BRMAs are all in London, though the majority of 
London BRMAs were not affected).  
For brevity, we report only estimated impacts 11 months after being fully rolled onto the 
reformed system. For each group, the first row (labelled „covariate-adjusted‟) shows 
estimates with controls analogous to those presented in Tables 5 and 6. The second row 
(labelled „unadjusted‟) shows estimates without controls for contemporaneous property 
characteristics (but with a control for initial BRMA, based on circumstances in January 
2011). The difference between the unadjusted and covariate-adjusted estimates provides a 
summary of the extent to which tenants ended up living in lower-value types of properties as 
a result of the reforms. 
Single adults aged 25-34 without dependent children lost an average of £13 per week in 
HB from the reforms (conditional on property size, local area fixed effects and neighborhood 
quality); we estimate that their quality-adjusted rents fell by about £5 per week, implying that 
just over one third of the incidence was on their landlords. The 95% confidence interval for 
the pass-through parameter – the share of the incidence that fell on the landlords – runs from 
16% to 66%. The estimates that do not adjust for property characteristics show larger falls in 
both HB entitlements and rents, suggesting that some of the individuals affected responded 
by moving to cheaper properties. We corroborate this directly below by looking at additional 
outcome variables.  
Families who were entitled to the 5-bedroom LHA rate in January 2011 lost an average of 
about £29 per week in HB entitlement from the reforms; we estimate that their rents fell by 
almost £12 per week, implying that about 40% of the incidence was on their landlords, with a 
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95% confidence interval running from 16% to 64%. As above, a comparison with the 
estimates that do not adjust for property characteristics suggests that these subsidy recipients 
also responded by living in cheaper types of properties. The finding that a large share of the 
incidence of the reforms falls on the landlords of this group does not support the possibility 
that the heterogeneity we find is driven by differences in search costs or the costs of moving, 
since such costs are likely to be relatively large for large families.  
Finally, subsidy recipients who, in January 2011, were living in one of the five BRMAs in 
which the overall national caps on LHA rates bind lost an average of about £42 per week in 
HB entitlement (conditional on property characteristics) from the reforms. We estimate that 
their quality-adjusted rents fell relatively little, though their raw rents fell more, suggesting 
some possible quality adjustments (but neither the covariate-adjusted nor unadjusted rent 
changed by a statistically significant amount). The finding that the incidence of the cuts has 
fallen on this group more than the other subgroups examined can be rationalised if demand 
for housing is less elastic along the margin of which area to live in than along the margin of 
property size within a given area.  
Table 6 provides direct evidence of whether recipients in these subgroups moved 
properties in response to the reforms (for dichotomous outcomes, we used a probit 
specification and report marginal effects at the mean of the covariates). A large proportion of 
single adults aged 25-34 responded by moving into shared accommodation: the reforms 
increased the probability of living in shared accommodation by 17 percentage points for this 
group. This is strong evidence of a relatively high elasticity of demand among this group of 
recipients. We also find some evidence that, consistent with a relatively high elasticity of 
demand, some of those previously entitled to the 5-bedroom rate responded by moving to 
smaller properties, and that both those affected by the extension of the Shared 
Accommodation Rate and those affected by the 5-bedroom rate are around 1 percentage point 
more likely to move house each month as a result of the reforms (the average (pre-reform) 
monthly moving rate among LHA recipients was 2.2%). Finally, although the reforms 
increased the probability of moving for those affected by the introduction of the national 
caps, less than half of those additional moves are out of the affected area: this is supporting 
evidence that, as argued above, demand is less elastic along the margin of which area to live 
in than along the margin of property size within a given area. 
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7. Discussion and conclusions 
During 2011 and 2012 the UK government reduced the generosity of the rent subsidy it 
provides to low-income private renters. Using monthly administrative panel data on subsidy 
recipients, and exploiting the phased roll-out of the reforms, we estimate that, on average, 
about 90% of the incidence of these cuts in the short-run was on tenants. But we find 
significant heterogeneity: for two groups singled out by the reforms on the basis that they 
were previously subsidised to rent properties that were large relative to their needs, we 
estimate that less than two-thirds of the incidence of the cut fell on them (and we can reject 
the possibility that all of the incidence was on them). 
Why is this? One possible explanation for our results is that these two groups were hit 
harder than average by the changes, and this simply made them quicker to notice and to make 
an effort to respond, explaining the large share of the incidence that fell on their landlords. 
We do not find this explanation plausible. First, it relies on short-run rigidities explaining the 
absence of larger changes in rents for other groups. For several reasons outlined in detail in 
section 5, we do not believe this to be the case. Second, our results show that tenants affected 
by the national caps lost by far the most HB of the subgroups considered, and yet the 
estimated incidence on them is high (and we cannot reject the hypothesis that it was 100%). 
We instead argue that it is variations in the elasticity of housing demand that is likely to 
explain the heterogeneity in incidence we observe. Theory suggests that the incidence of rent 
subsidies on landlords should be higher when demand for rented housing is more elastic. The 
two groups who shifted more of the incidence of the cuts onto their landlords are both groups 
to whom the previous system was deemed to be particularly generous – subsidising young 
single people to rent self-contained properties, and large families to rent 5-bedroom 
properties. The logic was essentially that, at the margin, housing for these groups had the 
characteristic of a luxury rather than a necessity. One might therefore expect the housing 
demand of these groups to be relatively elastic at the margin. For example, compared to 
individuals with dependent children or partners, 25-34 year-old single adults without children 
may be relatively willing to substitute between self-contained and shared accommodation 
when their HB entitlements are cut. In fact, we find direct supporting evidence of this, in that 
a significant number of individuals in this group did choose to move into shared 
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accommodation as a result of the subsidy cut. The group affected by the abolition of the 5-
bedroom rate are families with large numbers of children who were, in many cases, fully 
subsidised to rent some of the largest properties in their area. After the subsidy cut this group 
might not be prepared to pay much for an additional bedroom, rather than having more 
children sharing a room. Again, we find some evidence that some members of this group 
moved to smaller accommodation as a result of the reforms, though the estimated reduction 
in the average number of bedrooms is not statistically significant. Importantly, the between-
group heterogeneity in the elasticity of demand that our results indicate is not necessarily a 
property of the groups themselves. Rather, it is a consequence of the fact that the demand 
elasticity is higher at the margin once housing consumption is higher, and the previous 
system was arguably subsidising some groups to consume an especially large amount of 
housing (relative to their needs). In other words, while the heterogeneity is visible empirically 
by comparing different tenants who (due to the pre-reform system) were located at different 
points in the housing quality distribution relative to their needs, fundamentally the 
heterogeneity we find suggests there is variation in demand elasticities within-tenant along 
the housing quality distribution. 
Heterogeneity in the elasticity of demand could also explain some of the contrasting 
findings of different empirical studies on the incidence of rent subsidies. The most natural 
comparison for this study is Gibbons and Manning (2006), the other paper to look at the 
incidence of the HB programme. They studied reforms in the mid-1990s that introduced caps 
on the size of rents eligible for HB, based on average market rents in the local area. As such, 
the subsidy recipients who were directly affected by the mid-1990s reforms were a relatively 
high-rent minority who might be able to substitute more easily towards cheaper 
accommodation. In contrast, the reforms studied here extended these sorts of restrictions 
much further down the rent distribution – typically to the 30th percentile of local rents, and 
sometimes lower – and affected the large majority of subsidy recipients. Where we do focus 
on subgroups to whom the size of the subsidy was more generous relative to their needs prior 
to the reform, our results on incidence are closer to those of Gibbons and Manning. 
Meanwhile Eriksen and Ross (2015) – who exploit a similarly broad-based change to the 
generosity of US housing subsidies to the change we study here – come to conclusions about 
their overall incidence that are similar to ours. 
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A natural interpretation of this variation in demand elasticities along the housing quality 
distribution is that housing is a necessity at basic levels but becomes a luxury at the margin 
when housing consumption increases. The insight for the likely incidence of alternative rent 
subsidy regimes is potentially substantial. If, as cuts to subsidies bite further down the 
distributions of rent and housing quality, the average demand elasticity of affected tenants 
falls (and hence the effect of subsidies on total demand and rental prices falls), then the 
incidence of less generous subsidies will tend to fall proportionately more on tenants.  
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Appendix A: Policy background  
In 2015–16, spending on Housing Benefit (HB) in the UK is projected to be £24.5 billion: 
12% of all government spending on cash transfers.
16
 £9.1 billion of that total is spent on rent 
subsidies for recipients in the private rented sector (the focus of this paper), with the 
remainder spent on tenants in public housing (who are additionally subsidised indirectly 
through having a sub-market rent). Spending on HB for private renters increased by 136% in 
real terms between 2000–01 and 2010–11, thanks to a 94% increase in the caseload and a 
22% increase in average entitlements during a period of rising real rents. Since then, real 
expenditure has been roughly flat: further growth in the number of subsidy recipients has 
been offset by the impact of the reforms analysed in this paper, which cut the generosity of 
entitlements as part of a wider package of measures aimed at reducing government borrowing 
following the global financial crisis and associated recession.  
For subsidy recipients who rent from a private landlord and whose claim began in April 
2008 or later, HB entitlement is a function of actual rent and a cap known as the Local 
Housing Allowance (LHA) rate.
17
 For a subsidy recipient with no private income or assets 
who lives with no more than a partner plus any dependent children,
18
 the function under the 
pre-reform system was:  
                                   
The LHA rate varies geographically, and by the subsidy recipient‟s family type. The 
geographical variation is between areas are known as Broad Rental Market Areas, which are 
deemed to represent self-contained housing markets. There are 192 BRMAs in Great Britain, 
and a further 8 in Northern Ireland. The variation by family type arises through a set of rules 
that maps a subsidy recipient‟s family type to a reasonable accommodation size (ranging 
from a room in a shared property to a five bedroom property), known as the „size criteria‟. 
 
16
 HB is an entitlement-based program, rather than a cash-constrained, rationed program like the Housing Choice Voucher Program in the 
US, whereby any renter with sufficiently low income and financial assets is entitled to it. Figures on UK HB spending from Department for 
Work and Pensions (2015) “Benefit expenditure and caseload tables 2015”, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/benefit-
expenditure-and-caseload-tables-2015. 
17
 Claims that began before April 2008 are not assessed under the LHA rules, were not affected by the reforms studied here and are 
ignored in the rest of the paper. 
18
 For subsidy recipients living with an adult other than their partner, „non-dependent deductions‟ (NDDs) are subtracted from „rent‟ in 
the formula. In addition all HB claims are subject to a means test. This withdraws entitlement at a rate of 65p for each £1 by which income, 
after direct tax, exceeds a threshold that varies by family type. The system of NDDs and the rules of the means test were unaffected by the 
set of reforms studied here, so we abstract from them throughout and focus simply on „maximum‟ (pre-means test) entitlements ignoring the 
impacts of any NDDs. 
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Under the LHA rules, subsidy recipients are allowed one bedroom for each of the following 
occupiers, each coming only into the first category for which they are eligible: 
 a couple each aged 16 or over 
 an individual aged 16 or over 
 two children under 16 of the same sex 
 two children under 10 
 a child 
For example, a couple with two children aged 12 of opposite sex are entitled to three 
bedrooms, but a couple with two children aged 12 of the same sex are entitled to two 
bedrooms. Before the reforms, the maximum number of bedrooms was capped at 5, but the 
reforms lowered this to 4. Individuals living in shared (rather than self-contained) 
accommodation are entitled to the lower „shared accommodation rate‟. Before January 2012, 
this „shared accommodation rate‟ also automatically applied to all single childless individuals 
aged under 25; from January 2012, that age threshold was raised to 35. 
Before the reforms analysed in this paper, LHA rates were set equal to the median of 
private sector rents (not including those being rented by HB recipients) among properties of a 
similar size and in the same geographical area. As a result, the LHA rate that applied to a 
particular subsidy recipient should have been sufficient to cover the full rent of the median 
property rented by non-subsidy recipients in their area, of the size deemed appropriate for 
their family circumstances. If they rented a cheaper property than that, then subsidy recipients 
could effectively keep the first £15 a week of the difference. 
The reform package studied in this paper had several elements. One element removed the 
weekly „excess‟ of £15 that subsidy recipients could keep if their rent was less than their 
applicable LHA rate, so that the function became: 
                       
The other elements of the reform package affected the calculation of subsidy recipients‟ 
applicable LHA rates. These changes were: 
 setting LHA rates at the 30th percentile of local private sector rents among non-HB 
recipients (for the relevant property type) rather than at the median; 
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 abolishing the 5-bedroom rates, so that large families previously entitled to this 
became entitled only to the 4-bedroom rate; 
 capping the rates at £250, £250, £290, £340 and £400 per week for the shared 
accommodation, 1-bedroom, 2-bedroom, 3-bedroom and 4-bedroom rates respectively 
(reducing rates below the 30
th
 percentile of local rents in the highest-rent areas, which 
in practice means parts of inner London); 
 reducing the entitlement of most single adults without dependent children aged 25-34 
to the amount for a room in a shared property (known as the Shared Accommodation 
Rate or SAR), rather than the rate for a 1-bedroom property.  
The switch to the 30
th
 percentile and the removal of the excess affected a wide group of 
subsidy recipients. The other changes affected only small subgroups. In our empirical 
analysis we look separately at those subgroups.  
The removal of the £15 excess applied to new claimants from April 2011, and to existing 
recipients on their first annual claim anniversary after April 2011 (i.e. at some point between 
April 2011 and March 2012). The changes to the calculation of LHA rates applied to new 
claimants from April 2011 (at the same time as the excess removal); typically, they applied to 
existing recipients nine months after their first annual claim anniversary after April 2011 (i.e. 
nine months after the excess removal, at some point between January and December 2012). 
Where there has been a claim „reassessment‟, the relevant anniversary is the anniversary of 
the most recent reassessment rather than the anniversary of the start date of the claim. For 
ease of exposition, the rest of the discussion abstracts from this and just refers to „claim 
anniversaries‟. More precisely, the nine-month interval was a period of “transitional 
protection” from the cuts to LHA rates. This protection could expire before end of those nine 
months, if a claimant had a change of circumstance which triggered a claim reassessment, 
such as a change in family type or a move to another area. 
The changes that reduced the value of the LHA rate lower the cap on HB payments. They 
therefore give subsidy recipients an incentive to seek cheaper properties or to pay less for a 
given property, and the empirical issue that we explore in Section 6 is how much of the 
incidence then falls on landlords. The removal of the £15 excess has different effects on 
incentives. The pre-reform system (which allowed subsidy recipients to keep £15 of any 
difference between their actual rent and their LHA rate) gave subsidy recipients an incentive 
         
31 
 
to keep rent up to £15 below their LHA rate, either by choosing cheaper accommodation or 
by negotiating with landlords. Removing the excess means that subsidy recipients no longer 
have this incentive so, if they change their behaviour in response, we would expect them to 
choose more expensive types of accommodation or to accept a higher rent for a given 
property. Hence this change could effectively transfer the excess from tenants to landlords, 
rather than from either group to the taxpayer. There is no plausible mechanism by which it 
could lead to lower rents.  
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Appendix B: Data appendix 
SHBE is made up of returns submitted to central government each month by local authorities 
(LAs). It includes monthly information on contractual levels of rent and characteristics of the 
subsidy recipients. Much of this information – including rent, location and family type – is 
required for the HB entitlement calculation and recipients are therefore legally required to 
keep it up to date. 
B. 1 Definition of key variables 
The derivation of weekly contractual rents in the SHBE data is typically straightforward, 
using a combination of the rent amount reported and the periodicity that it is reported to cover 
(weekly, monthly, etc). 
Additional data cleaning was required in some cases where the periodicity was recorded as 
weekly when in fact it was monthly. This issue was almost exclusively confined to cases 
recorded by a single software provider (Civica) and for monthly records no later than early 
2011. Misrecording is evident from the fact that average weekly rents in affected Local 
Authorities appeared to fall by approximately 75% in a single month when the issue was 
resolved. We corrected for this error by identifying subsidy recipients for whom, when 
comparing one month‟s record with the next, periodicity changed from weekly to monthly 
with no change to the reported rent. For such subsidy recipients we assume that the 
periodicity had always been monthly when reported weekly in prior months, and hence 
multiplied reported rents in prior months by (12/52) in order to convert them into weekly 
amounts. For the small number of Civica cases with periodicity recorded as weekly where the 
claim ended no later than early 2011 (specifically, where the last record of the claim is from a 
scan submitted before 1
st
 March 2011), we record weekly rents as missing. This is because 
we know that these periodicities are relatively likely to be incorrect, but some will be correct 
(i.e. some subsidy recipients genuinely report weekly amounts), and we are unable to 
distinguish between the two without being able to observe a change in periodicity when the 
error was corrected. 
We set rents to missing in four other circumstances: 
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 A joint tenancy is recorded and the software provider is Saffron/Camino, as there ap-
pears to be a tendency for the full rent for the dwelling to be recorded in such cases 
(rather than just the share of the rent for which the subsidy recipient is liable); 
 rent is recorded as zero; 
 dummy values (beginning 9999) appear to have been used for recorded rents; 
 periodicity is recorded as daily, as implied weekly rents tend to be very high in these 
cases. 
 
Maximum weekly HB entitlements, ignoring non-dependent deductions, are known 
functions of rent and the applicable LHA rate. Where the excess „rule‟ still applies, we define 
them as the minimum of the LHA rate and the rent plus £15. Otherwise, we define them 
simply as the minimum of the LHA rate and rent. We set maximum HB entitlement to 
missing in rare cases where the LHA rate is recorded as zero.  
Analyses that use rent, maximum HB, or rent net of HB as the dependent variable are all 
conducted on the common sample for which all three of these variables are non-missing. 
Data cleaning on other variables was also carried out where necessary. For example, 
certain local authorities at certain times incorrectly record whether or not subsidy recipients 
are in shared accommodation. Instances of this are identifiable from the fact that, in certain 
local authorities in certain months, a clear majority of subsidy recipients are recorded as 
residing in shared accommodation – with the proportion very close to the proportion of 
subsidy recipients in self-contained accommodation elsewhere. It seems clear that these cases 
have simply been recorded the wrong way round, and it is therefore straightforward to 
correct. 
B.2 Sample selection – existing recipients 
The basis for our analysis of all existing recipients is a random one-in-three sample of all 
HB recipients assessed under the LHA rules in January 2011, which is a sample of 283,574 
subsidy recipients. Some individuals renting in the private sector were receiving HB assessed 
under a different set of rules: such recipients are disregarded in our analysis. 
43,851 subsidy recipients are dropped from this sample because the point in time at which 
they would be affected by the reforms analysed cannot be robustly determined, leaving us 
with a final sample of 239,723 subsidy recipients. In the absence of behavioural response 
(which we do not incorporate in order to preserve the exogeneity of our treatment), the point 
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at which a subsidy recipient was affected by the reforms was determined by the date of the 
last claim reassessment or claim anniversary in the year prior to April 2011 (or the date on 
which the claim began, if it began in the year prior to April 2011 and there had been no 
reassessment since). For full details on how this date is calculated, see Brewer et al (2014). In 
short, there are three reasons why the point at which a subsidy recipient would have been 
affected can be impossible to determine robustly: 
1. Some individuals whose claim began before April 2010 do not appear to have had any 
claim reassessments or anniversaries between April 2010 and March 2011, because 
their LHA rate remained constant throughout this period. For most of these individu-
als, it is therefore impossible to determine the anniversary of their claim. It is possible 
for a subsidy recipient‟s LHA rate after a claim reassessment or anniversary genuinely 
to be the same as their previous one. We can use publicly available LHA rates in dif-
ferent BRMAs over time to identify the subsidy recipients for which this was the case 
(and those subsidy recipients are not dropped). 
2. Some subsidy recipients have large gaps in their records, because local authorities do 
not always submit scans every month. If a gap of more than 60 days occurs prior to the 
point at which we identify a subsidy recipient as having had their last claim reassess-
ment or anniversary before April 2011, we are unable to calculate the date on which it 
occurred with sufficient accuracy. 
3. Where an individual‟s claim has never been visibly reassessed, and they have not been 
dropped as a result of rule 1 (because their claim began after April 2010 or because a 
reassessment or anniversary during 2010–11 should not have changed their LHA rate), 
the point at which they will be affected (in the absence of behavioural response) de-
pends on the start date of their claim. For some of these cases, the start date recorded 
in the SHBE data extract is not deemed sufficiently reliable, for one of the following 
reasons: 
a. The start date recorded is more than three months earlier than the first observa-
tion we have for that individual; 
b. The start date recorded is later than the first observation we have for that indi-
vidual; 
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c. The start date is in April 2009, and the individual lives in one of a number of 
local authorities in which all start dates from 2008–09 were reset to April 
2009.
19
 
When looking at the impact on the probability of moving home, we restrict the estimation 
sample to observations from April 2011 onwards because an individual‟s claim-cohort is me-
chanically related to moves prior to that date. We apply the same sample restriction when 
looking at the probability of living in shared accommodation, because the sample we select 
for that analysis excludes anyone living in shared accommodation prior to the start of the roll-
out (since those already in shared accommodation were not affected by the extended cover-
age of the Shared Accommodation Rate). 
Appendix Table A1 shows that four example claim-cohorts (February, May, August and 
November) look almost identical in terms of demographic characteristics, employment status, 
local-area deprivation, rents and housing benefit entitlements. 
  
 
19
 These local authorities are Stockton-on-Tees, Gateshead, Blackpool, Rochdale, Fylde, Rushcliffe, South Staffordshire, Taunton Deane 
and Wrexham.  
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B. 3 Sample selection – new claimants 
For our analysis of new claimants, we ignore any SHBE records for LHA claims that had 
already started before the period of data used for analysis (i.e. before June 2010). For the 
records that remain – those of new LHA claims – we look at the circumstances of the 
claimant the first time that they were recorded. Since local authorities submit scans of their 
records once per month, this means that we extract the first monthly scan for each claim, and 
ignore all subsequent monthly scans  
One piece of data cleaning was required in order to ensure that we were defining new 
claims robustly. Scans from some Local Authorities have a tendency to include claim start 
dates that have been erroneously reset on a particular date, making the number of new claims 
appear larger than it really is in that Local Authority on that day and making the start dates of 
some existing claims appear more recent than they actually are. We were able to detect 
instances of this by identifying claims which appear to have started soon after (within six 
months of) a previous active claim by the same claimant, and looking at the proportion of 
apparent new claims in each Local Authority on each date which have those characteristics. 
This proportion is far higher than normal in certain Local Authorities on particular days. 
Where the proportion exceeds 70% on a day in which at least five apparent new claims were 
made in a certain Local Authority, we conclude that any apparent new claim in that Local 
Authority on that day which shortly follows a previous active claim by the same claimant is 
likely to be erroneous. We therefore exclude such claims. 
To guard against using information that did not genuinely apply at the beginning of a 
claim, we exclude from analysis claims for which the first monthly scan appears more than 
four months after the recorded start date of the claim. For example, if a claim is recorded as 
having started in January 2011, but the first scan of the relevant Local Authority‟s records 
which included that claim was submitted in or after June 2011, we would exclude this claim 
from the analysis. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the paper show a large rise in the rents and entitlements of those 
claiming HB in the run up to the April 2011 reform. Beatty et. al. (2013) additionally shows 
that these spikes in rents and entitlements were accompanied by a large increase in the 
volume of claims, and these spikes in volumes, entitlements and rents can be explained by the 
financial incentives created by the way the reforms were rolled out. Because someone making 
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a new claim just after 1
st
 April 2011 would face the reformed, less generous, HB system, but 
someone starting a new claim just before 1
st
 April would not face this system in full for 
another 21 months, claimants faced a strong incentive to make their claim before the cut-off 
date. Furthermore, the difference in the size of entitlements between the unreformed and 
reformed system was, in general, increasing in the size of (pre-reform) entitlement, so those 
with higher entitlements (and rents) faced a stronger incentive to claim before the cut-off 
date; this explains the change in the composition of new claims that lies behind the spike in 
mean entitlements and rents. For example, the proportion of new claims occurring in London 
rose by three percentage points between January and March 2011, from 14.3% to 17.3%; the 
same proportion did not fluctuate by more than one percentage point over any other two-
month period in these data. Similarly, the average number of individuals in the household of 
new claimants rose from 1.86 to 1.95 between January and March 2011, also a larger 
fluctuation than over any other two-month period in the data.
20
 The grey line on Figure 2 
plots mean residuals from a regression of rent on a set of indicators for BRMA and the 
number of bedrooms, and shows that the spike in raw rents is largely (though not entirely) 
explained just by these two factors (it also shows that the decline in mean rents over this 
period was more than explained by changes in the composition of new claimants).  
Appendix Table A2 shows, the pre- and post-reform claimants in our estimation sample 
are extremely similar with respect to observed characteristics.  
1
 Both analyses are available on request. 
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TABLE 1 
Demographic characteristics of existing recipients in January 2011 
   
Characteristic Universe 
 
Estimation sample 
 
Household type   
Single man 29% 29% 
Single woman 16% 16% 
Couples without children 6% 6% 
Single parents 33% 32% 
Couples with children 16% 16% 
   
Age    
Under 25 16% 16% 
25-34 32% 32% 
35-44 25% 25% 
45-59 19% 19% 
60 and above 8% 8% 
   
Employment status   
In-work family 31% 31% 
Out-of-work family 69% 69% 
   
Neighborhood 
deprivation
a
   
Most deprived quintile 34% 33% 
2nd overall quintile 27% 27% 
3rd overall quintile 19% 19% 
4th overall quintile 12% 13% 
Least deprived quintile 8% 8% 
   
N 850,249 239,723 
Note: For more details on the construction of this index see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-
indices-of-deprivation-2010-technical-report.  
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE 2 
Rents and HB entitlements of existing recipients in January 2011 
   
 Universe 
(£ per week) 
Estimation sample 
(£ per week) 
Rent   
Mean 134 134 
Median  115 115 
25th percentile 92 92 
75th percentile 150 150 
   
HB entitlement   
Mean 126 126 
Median  111 110 
25th percentile 91 91 
75th percentile 144 144 
   
N 850,249 239,723 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE 3 
Estimated impact of cuts to Housing Benefit on existing recipients, £/wk 
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
12 months 
before main 
impact 
Housing 
benefit 
3.09 
(0.69) 
0.66 
(0.35) 
0.93 
(0.35) 
-0.53 
(0.16) 
-0.68 
(0.15) 
Rent 
3.43 
(0.61) 
0.95 
(0.28) 
1.29 
(0.27) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
Rent net of 
HB 
0.34 
(0.24) 
0.28 
(0.25) 
0.36 
(0.26) 
0.51 
(0.15) 
0.54 
(0.14) 
Estimated 
pass-through 
(proportion)  
   0.20 
(0.15) 
Loss of 
excess 
 
Housing 
benefit 
-0.72 
(0.73) 
-3.40 
(0.41) 
-3.18 
(0.39) 
-4.90 
(0.44) 
-4.98 
(0.42) 
Rent 
3.73 
(0.74) 
0.93 
(0.31) 
1.25 
(0.30) 
-0.74 
(0.29) 
-0.81 
(0.27) 
Rent net of 
HB 
4.46 
(0.23) 
4.33 
(0.27) 
4.43 
(0.28) 
4.17 
(0.34) 
4.17 
(0.34) 
 
Estimated 
pass-through 
(proportion)  
   0.16 
(0.05) 
Point of 
main 
impact 
Housing 
benefit 
-4.12 
(1.93) 
-6.67 
(0.85) 
-6.42 
(0.82) 
-8.31 
(1.09) 
-8.31 
(1.01) 
Rent 
5.17 
(1.43) 
2.78 
(0.40) 
3.08 
(0.40) 
-0.65 
(0.78) 
-0.73 
(0.68) 
Rent net of 
HB 
9.29 
(0.71) 
9.45 
(0.79) 
9.50 
(0.80) 
7.66 
(0.84) 
7.58 
(0.85) 
 
Estimated 
pass-through 
(proportion)  
   0.09 
(0.08) 
11 months 
after main 
impact 
Housing 
benefit 
-1.35 
(2.02) 
-5.04 
(0.82) 
-4.87 
(0.80) 
-7.08 
(1.07) 
-6.84 
(0.92) 
Rent 
6.97 
(1.84) 
3.43 
(0.56) 
3.64 
(0.56) 
-0.79 
(1.19) 
-0.79 
(1.09) 
Rent net of 
HB 
8.32 
(0.39) 
8.47 
(0.48) 
8.51 
(0.48) 
6.29 
(0.80) 
6.06 
(0.83) 
 Estimated 
pass-through 
(proportion)  
   0.11 
(0.15) 
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Controls for:      
Local area, number of 
bedrooms and interactions 
 X X X X 
Neighborhood deprivation  X X X X 
„Claim-cohort‟ fixed effects   X X X 
BRMA-level linear time 
trend 
   X X 
Month dummies     X X 
Family type, age and 
interactions 
    X 
N 239,576 239,576 239,094 239,094 238,782 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level. Standard errors on estimated pass-
through parameters account for correlation in the errors from the two parent regressions. When controlling for local area, number of 
bedrooms and interactions we control for LA, BRMA, number of bedrooms in the property (shared accommodation, 1 bedroom, 2 
bedrooms, 3 bedrooms, 4 bedrooms, 5 or more bedrooms), and interaction terms that capture all possible combinations of number of 
bedrooms and BRMA. When controlling for family type, age and interactions we define 37 mutually exclusive combinations of family type 
and age: families without children are split jointly by family type (single men, single women, couples) and age of claimant (under 25, 25-34, 
35-44, 45-59, 60 or more); families with dependent children are split jointly by whether lone parents or couple parents, age of claimant 
(under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45 or more), and number of children (1 or 2 or more for under 25s, and 1, 2 or 3 or more for other ages). 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE 4 
Estimated impact of cuts to Housing Benefit on new claimants, £/wk 
Model specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Housing benefit 
-9.28 
(1.18) 
-6.33 
(0.46) 
-7.86 
(0.52) 
-8.20 
(0.50) 
Rent 
-1.57 
(1.11) 
1.64 
(0.42) 
-0.14 
(0.65) 
-0.38 
(0.64) 
Rent net of HB 
7.71 
(0.34) 
7.97 
(0.35) 
7.72 
(0.49) 
7.82 
(0.49) 
Estimated pass-through 
(proportion) 
   
0.05 
(0.08) 
Controls for:     
Local area, number of 
bedrooms and interactions 
 X X X 
Neighborhood deprivation  X X X 
BRMA-level linear time 
trends 
  X X 
Family type, age and 
interactions 
   X 
N 667,276 661,961 661,961 659,095 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level. Standard errors on estimated pass-
through parameters account for correlation in the errors from the two parent regressions. When controlling for local area, number of 
bedrooms and interactions we control for LA, BRMA, number of bedrooms in the property (shared accommodation, 1 bedroom, 2 
bedrooms, 3 bedrooms, 4 bedrooms, 5 or more bedrooms), and interaction terms that capture all possible combinations of number of 
bedrooms and BRMA. When controlling for BRMA-level time trends, we allow them to differ before and after the reform. When controlling 
for family type, age and interactions, we define 40 mutually exclusive combinations of family type and age: families without children are 
split jointly by family type (single men, single women, couples) and age of claimant (under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 or more); 
families with dependent children are split jointly by whether lone parents or couple parents, age of claimant (under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45 or 
more), and number of children (1 or 2 or more for under 25s, and 1, 2 or 3 or more for other ages). The results here differ slightly from those 
presented in Beatty et. al. (2013), as controls for neighborhood deprivation were not included in that analysis. 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE 5 
Estimated impact of cuts to Housing Benefit on existing recipients likely to be affected by certain elements of the 
reform package (11 months after main impact), £/wk 
  Housing 
benefit 
Rent Rent net of 
HB 
Estimated 
pass-through 
(proportion) 
N 
Increased scope of 
shared 
accommodation 
rate 
Covariate-adjusted 
-13.05 
(1.36) 
-4.80 
(1.31) 
8.25 
(1.73) 
0.36  
(0.10) 
49,569 
Unadjusted 
-15.55 
(1.59) 
-7.36 
(1.55) 
8.18 
(1.78) 
 
49,635 
Abolition of 5-
bedroom LHA rate 
Covariate-adjusted 
-29.21 
(8.49) 
-11.69 
(5.48) 
17.52 
(5.44) 
0.40 
(0.12) 
5,699 
Unadjusted 
-31.60 
(9.99) 
-19.04 
(9.27) 
12.56 
(5.36) 
 
5,703 
National caps on 
LHA rates 
Covariate-adjusted 
-41.93 
(9.96) 
-5.68 
(10.19) 
36.25 
(12.31) 
0.14 
(0.24) 
16,992 
Unadjusted 
-48.48 
(12.59) 
-17.07 
(14.20) 
31.41 
(12.13) 
 
16,992 
All existing 
recipients 
Covariate-adjusted 
-6.84 
(0.92) 
-0.79 
(1.09) 
6.06 
(0.83) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
238,782 
Unadjusted 
-7.40 
(0.91) 
-1.11 
(1.12) 
6.28 
(0.84) 
 
239,279 
Note: Standard errors in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level. Standard errors on estimated pass-
through parameters account for correlation in the errors from the two parent regressions. “Covariate-adjusted” figures include controls for 
BRMA, local authority, number of bedrooms in the property, local area deprivation, „claim-cohort‟, calendar month, linear time trends in 
each BRMA, and family type and age. “Unadjusted” figures do not include controls for contemporaneous BRMA, LA, number of bedrooms 
and local area deprivation, but do include controls for BRMA in January 2011. 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE 6 
Estimated impact of cuts to maximum entitlements on property choices of existing recipients likely to be affected 
by certain elements of the reform (11 months after main impact) 
   N 
Increased scope of 
shared 
accommodation rate 
Probability of moving (ppts per month) 
1.0 
(0.5) 
43,655 
Probability of living in shared 
accommodation (ppts) 
17.0 
(0.4) 
43,564 
Abolition of 5-
bedroom LHA rate 
Probability of moving (ppts per month) 
0.6 
(0.8) 
5,406 
Number of bedrooms 
-0.14 
(0.16) 
5,700 
National caps on 
LHA rates 
Probability of moving (ppts per month) 
0.8 
(0.6) 
16,163 
Probability of moving out of capped 
area (ppts per month) 
0.3 
(0.5) 
16,163 
All existing 
recipients Probability of moving (ppts per month) 
0.4 
(0.2) 
219,592 
Note: Standard errors given in brackets are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level. When the outcome variable is 
probability of moving, results are from a probit regression including controls for BRMA in January 2011, calendar month, claim-cohort, 
family type and age and rent and claim anniversaries, run on data from April 2011 onwards. When outcome variable is probabili ty of living 
in shared accommodation, results are from a probit regression with all controls listed above as well as linear time trends in each BRMA, run 
on data from April 2011 onwards. When outcome variable is number of bedrooms, results are from an OLS regression with same controls as 
given above. 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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Appendix TABLE A1 
Characteristics of example claim-cohorts in January 2011 
     
Characteristic February claim-
cohort 
 
May claim-cohort 
 
August claim-cohort 
 
November claim-
cohort 
 
Household type     
Single man 27% 28% 30% 31% 
Single woman 16% 15% 16% 16% 
Couples without children 7% 6% 6% 7% 
Single parents 33% 34% 32% 31% 
Couples with children 17% 16% 16% 16% 
     
Age      
Under 25 17% 14% 17% 18% 
25-34 31% 31% 33% 32% 
35-44 25% 26% 25% 25% 
45-59 19% 20% 18% 19% 
60 and above 7% 9% 7% 7% 
     
Employment status     
In-work family 31% 33% 33% 32% 
Out-of-work family 69% 67% 67% 68% 
     
Neighborhood 
deprivation   
  
Bottom overall quintile 36% 33% 34% 32% 
2nd overall quintile 26% 28% 26% 27% 
3rd overall quintile 19% 19% 18% 19% 
4th overall quintile 12% 13% 13% 12% 
Top overall quintile 7% 7% 8% 7% 
     
Mean rent £130pw £138pw £135pw £130pw 
Mean HB entitlement £122pw £131pw £127pw £122pw 
     
N 15,754 16,822 17,754 30,586 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
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TABLE A2 
Demographic characteristics of new claimants 
   
Characteristic June 2010 to November 2010 
(% of claimants) 
June 2011 to November 2011 
(% of claimants) 
Family type   
Single man 36% 35% 
Single woman 19% 19% 
Couples without children 7% 8% 
Single parents 24% 25% 
Couples with children 14% 15% 
   
Age    
Under 25 23% 23% 
25-34 33% 33% 
35-44 23% 23% 
45-54 13% 13% 
55-64 6% 6% 
65 and above 3% 3% 
   
Employment status   
In-work family 29% 30% 
Out-of-work family 71% 70% 
   
Neighborhood 
deprivation   
Bottom overall quintile 33% 33% 
2nd overall quintile 27% 27% 
3rd overall quintile 19% 19% 
4th overall quintile 13% 13% 
Top overall quintile 8% 8% 
   
N 336,486 334,093 
Source: authors‟ calculations using SHBE data. 
 
         
